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Abstract - Our paper models the relationship between price and quality regulation in a physical network 
industry. The analysis is closely inspired by some of the major regulatory features of the current organisation of 
the British railways industry, even though its insights have more general implications. Our model focuses on the 
combination of price and quality regulation and accounts for the existence of entry costs which create a 
competitive advantage for the incumbents in the competitive franchise bidding. We show that the effectiveness 
of the quality control is nonmonotone in the quality standard set by the Regulator. Moreover, we advance that 
price regulation negatively affects the extent to which the service quality can be controlled. By partially 
subsidising the entry costs, the Regulator can intensify the competition for the market and improve the regulation 
of the service quality. Nevertheless, since entry costs subsidisation involves social costs (e.g., distortionary 
taxation), the Regulator faces a trade-off between price regulation, on the one hand, and quality regulation and 
entry costs subsidisation, on the other hand. 
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 1 Introduction
The present work models the relationship between price and quality regulation in a
physical network industry. Our analysis is closely inspired by some of the major regu-
latory features of the current organisation of the British railways industry, even though
its insights have more general implications.
In 1993 the former monopoly of British Railways was privatised and replaced by a
multitude of ﬁrms, operating in a context of both vertical and horizontal separation.
Competition for the market was introduced in the organisation of passengers transport,
with the operating companies contending the franchises through periodic bids. More-
over, the franchisees were vertically separated from the companies owning the rolling
stock. Finally, price regulation was established with respect to one portion of tickets
fares.
Price regulation is one of the issues considered in our model. The reformed UK
railways contemplates a hybrid fares system. In order to limit the temporary monopoly
power of the franchisee, the Government regulates the fares of the services with a most
rigid demand. For instance, commuters fares are typically regulated.1 On the contrary,
operators are free to set the ticket fares for the complementary portion of the services
they provide. Clearly the degree of ticket regulation implemented by the Government
can be seen as a policy tool.
The competitive bidding is the second organisational feature analysed in the pa-
per. The British network currently includes several geographical areas, each of them
supplied by a franchisee (Train Operating Company). The reallocation of franchises
through competitive bids inevitably entails some entry costs, to which the extent of the
competitive pressure on the incumbent operators is crucially related. For instance, the
entrant must negotiate the utilisation of the infrastructure (e.g., stations), implement
marketing policies, train the crew, convert the trains according to the new franchise’s
design. All this kind of costs are sunk for the incumbent who aﬀorded them when it
was granted the franchise at ﬁrst place. Since part of these entry costs depends on
the obligations included by the Regulator in the franchise contract, entry costs can be
regulated, at least partially, through the deﬁnition of the franchise contract and/or the
public subsidisation of these obligations. Hence, in our model, we focus on the entry
costs subsidy as a second policy tool under the control of the regulatory authority.2
Finally, the service quality standard which aﬀects the franchise renewal is the third
1A further reference to price regulation as a mechanism limiting the monopolistic power of the
operating ﬁrm can be found in B¨ os (1999).
2The issue of the competitive advantage of the incumbent in franchise bidding is also highlighted in
Williamson (1976).
1policy tool considered in the paper. Franchise agreements include the speciﬁcation of
the service performance regime (in terms of timetable accomplishment) and a number
of Key Performance Indicators, such as train cleanliness, information provision, etc.3
We formally analyze the interaction between price, quality and entry costs regulation
in a simple two-period model. At the outset, the Regulator sets the portion of regulated
fares in each area of the network and the associated price, the amount of entry cost
subsidy, and the minimum quality standard for the passenger service. In the ﬁrst period,
a train operating company, who has already been assigned the franchise to operate the
service in a given area of the network, decides its (irreversible) investment in service
quality and operates the service. In the second period, the company’s franchise is
automatically renewed if its service quality satisﬁes the minimum quality requirement.
The franchise is auctioned to all the operating companies of the network otherwise.4
If the incumbent wins the auction, it retains the franchise and operates the service
also in the second period after having paid the Regulator the second highest bid. On
the contrary, if the auction is won by an entrant, the franchise is reallocated to a new
provider who must pay the Regulator the second highest bid and bear the portion of
the entry costs which is not subsidised by the Regulator.
Our main ﬁndings are as follows. When price regulation is partial (i.e., the service
provider can freely set a portion of the fares), the eﬀectiveness of the quality regulation
is non-monotone in the minimum quality standard. If the quality standard is low,
the quality control is not eﬀective because the train operating company guarantees the
renewal of its franchise by simply setting the quality level that maximise its proﬁts in
each operating period. If the quality standard is high, the quality control is not eﬀective
because the loss in the ﬁrst period proﬁts due to the high investment in service quality
necessary to comply with the quality control oﬀsets the gain in the second period proﬁts
due to the avoidance of the competitive pressure for the market (i.e., the pre-emption
of the franchise bidding in the second period).
Next, we focus on the interplay among the regulatory tools: i.e., the extent of price
regulation, the quality standard and the entry costs subsidy, for an optimal (second-best)
regulation policy, where social welfare increases with the service quality but decreases
with the ticket fares and the entry costs subsidy.5 We ﬁnd that price regulation has
3More details on this topic can be found in Strategic Rail Authority (2002).
4We model the competitive bidding for the service franchise as a second price auction open to
operating companies in the other areas of the network. However, our main results also hold under
alternative assumptions on the competitive bidding process, such as ﬁrst price auctions.
5We anticipate that the social welfare function reﬂects a distributive concern on consumers’ welfare.
Even in absence of any deadweight loss due to monopolistic pricing, the welfare decreases with the
service price because consumers’ surplus has a higher social value than proﬁts. Social welfare clearly
2a negative eﬀect on the controllability of the service quality via the minimum qual-
ity standard and the competitive pressure for the market. The Regulator can contrast
this eﬀect with higher subsidisation to the entry costs, in order to reduce the incum-
bent’s advantage in the competitive bidding for the service franchise. However, this
intervention is socially costly in terms of distortionary taxation. Hence, there exists a
trade-oﬀ between price regulation, on the one hand, and quality regulation and entry
costs subsidisation, on the other hand.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the model, which is further
developed in Section 3. Section 4 shows that the eﬀectiveness of quality control is non-
monotone in the quality standard set by the Regulator. Section 5 analyzes the role
played by price regulation and entry costs on the controllability of the service quality.
The results of the second-best analysis are presented in Section 6. Finally, Section 7
contains the concluding remarks. Some technical parts of the paper are relegated in the
appendix.
2 The Model
We model the interaction between a ﬁrm franchised to provide passenger transport
services in a given area (TOC hereafter) and the Regulator. In the background, we
assume the existence of a suﬃciently high number of TOCs in the industry, so that ex
ante collusion in the bidding process is ruled out.
Preferences and Technology
In the geographical area where the TOC initially holds a franchise and operates passen-
ger services, there is a unit mass of identical customers. Each customer purchases one
unit of train services per period, and his/her willingness to pay for the service increases
with the service quality, set by the TOC in the normalised interval [0,1]. More precisely,
the utility gained by each customer from one unit of train service of quality q bought at
price p is:
U(q) = rq − p,
whereby r measures the willingness to pay for a unit of quality. Given inelastic (unit)
demand and identical preferences for quality, if free to set the tickets price, the TOC
will exploit its monopoly power and reap all consumers surplus by setting p = rq. In
increases with the service quality because consumers’ surplus increases with quality. Finally, funding
the entry cost subsidy involves social costs due to distortionary taxation.
3order to limit the TOC’s monopoly power, the Regulator directly sets the unit price
R < r on a fraction of the services, leaving the TOC free to price the complementary
fraction of services (1 − α).







The TOC’s proﬁts ﬂow for one period of service operation at the quality level q, is
therefore given by:





We assume that the regulated fare, R, will never impose a loss to the TOC, even
when the quality level is very high. On the other hand, most of our results simply
requires that the TOC’s operating proﬁts are suﬃciently small when the level of service
quality is close to the upper bound of its range, i.e., q = 1. Formally, we will assume
that π(1) = αR+r(1−α)− 1
2c is close to zero when α = 0, and equals zero when α = 1,
which implies the parametric restriction: R = 1
2c < r.6 According to this parametric
restriction, the upper bound for R is r. Nevertheless, we will later show that is not
optimal for the Regulator to set R so that R
r is close to 1.





We assume that qM is in the interior of the range [0,1], that is, r(1 − α) < c.
Social Welfare
The policies implemented by the Regulator aim at promoting the service quality stan-
dard qm and increasing the consumers surplus (CS) through the limitation of the tem-
porary monopoly power of the incumbent. Let us recall the utility function previously
speciﬁed: U(q) = rq − p. Without price regulation consumers would pay p = rq, be-
cause the TOC would be in the position of exploiting its monopoly power. Thanks to the
partial price regulation implemented by the Regulator, consumers pay αR + r(1 − α)q
instead. The consumer surplus, CS, as a function of α, R and q, is therefore:
CS = rq − [αR + r(1 − α)q].
6Obviously, R can be equal to zero, in which case the unit price for those ticket fares that are
regulated is zero.
4Ultimately, the objective function of the Regulator (social welfare function) is:
SW = π + βCS − λ(κ
0 − κ). (3)
The coeﬃcient β > 1 formalises the Regulator’s distributive concern on consumers
welfare: the weight of the TOC’s proﬁt in the welfare function (that is, one) is lower
than the weight of the consumer surplus (that is, β). The negative term of the social
welfare function represents the social cost of entry costs subsidisation. More precisely,
(κ0 − κ) is the subsidy of the entry costs granted by the Regulator to one potential
entrant. That is the diﬀerence between a given amount of entry costs, κ0, and the
portion of these costs that is actually aﬀorded by the entrant, κ. The loss of welfare
arises from the distortionary taxation needed to ﬁnance the entry costs subsidy: λ > 0
is the measure of the unit social cost of taxation.
Next, it is worth to anticipate some implications of the assumption that the Regulator
is more concerned of the consumer surplus than proﬁts, i.e., β > 1. Notice ﬁrst that
the set of Regulator’s policy tools is suﬃciently complete to allow for non distortionary
surplus transfers from the TOC to consumers.7 Therefore, β > 1 implies that the
Regulator will never implement a policy leading to a negative consumer surplus.
The condition requiring the consumer surplus to be strictly positive generates the





The Regulator will never violate this restriction when setting up its quality control pol-
icy. As it will become clear later, when the quality regulation is eﬀective, the equilibrium
level of q equals the minimum quality standard. Therefore, the Regulator’s relative pref-





in order to avoid a negative consumer surplus.
Timing
We consider a two-period model. At the beginning of the ﬁrst period, the Regulator
sets: the fraction of regulated fares, α; the regulated fare, R; the minimum quality
7In particular, the Regulator can adjust the unit price of the regulated fares R, causing no distortion
for the social welfare.
5requirement, qm, according to condition (4); and the subsidy of the entry costs (κ0 − κ)
(so that κ is the entry costs left to the entrant after the subsidy). After all policy tools
are set by the Regulator, the TOC decides the service quality q to oﬀer to its customers.
Once set at the beginning of the ﬁrst period, the TOC’s service quality remains ﬁxed
for both periods. In other words, we assume that the service quality involves sunk costs
which cannot be quickly reversed: the TOC’s choice on service quality aﬀects its second
period franchise. If the TOC decides to comply with the quality standard set by the
Regulator, i.e., if it selects q ≥ qm, its franchise is automatically renewed for the second
period. On the contrary, if the TOC sets q < qm (no compliance), the franchise is
auctioned. As explained in more details below, we model a second-price auction.
3 The Industry Equilibrium
We solve the model by backward induction.
3.1 Second Period Equilibrium
In the second period two alternative types of equilibrium are possible. If the TOC
decides to comply with the regulatory standard in the ﬁrst period, in the second period
its franchise is automatically renewed and the line is not auctioned. The TOC’s second-
period proﬁt in this case is





On the contrary, if the TOC does not comply with the Regulator’s requirement and
sets a quality level below the regulatory standard, the line is auctioned. The auction is
designed as a second-price auction open to all companies operating in the network. As
it is well known, the bidders dominant strategy in a second-price auction is to bid the
entire private value. In our case, this translates in bidding the entire expected proﬁt
from operating the franchise. In the auction, the entry costs left on the entrant, κ, act
as a competitive advantage for the incumbent. We mainly focus on the case of partial
subsidisation, i.e., κ > 0. This is consistent with the idea that the information on the
entry costs is likely to be asymmetric between the Regulator and the entrant, so that
the former does not provide full coverage for the entry costs eventually reported by the
entrant. A second reason for not focusing on the case where κ = 0, is that the full
subsidisation may lead to an undesirable level of distortionary taxation.
6The bid of the incumbent is:






whilst the bid of the potential entrant is:






The service quality level of a potential entrant, qe, can be observed by the Regulator:
it has been set in the ﬁrst period on the line where the potential entrant operates the
service.8
Note that the reason why the franchise is auctioned is that the incumbent selected
a no compliance strategy in the ﬁrst period. As we show in the next section, this
means that qi is equal to qM, i.e., the incumbent selects the level of service quality that
maximises its ﬁrst period proﬁts. Provided that the level of quality is observable, if the
franchise is auctioned, all the potential bidders anticipate that qi = qM. This means
that there is no quality level such that the entrant’s proﬁts before the entry costs are
greater than the incumbent’s expected proﬁts. In other words, in the ﬁrst period, all
service providers anticipate a zero proﬁt from participating to any auction. Since the
TOCs enjoy a symmetric position in the market, they all set q = qM in the ﬁrst period,
in order to maximise their proﬁt functions. Hence, a symmetric equilibrium with respect
to the level of service quality is established, i.e., qi = qe. Obviously, since one line is
auctioned, because the compliance strategy is not optimal, then all lines are auctioned.
Given Bi and Be above, in a symmetric equilibrium the incumbent wins the auction
as long as κ > 0.9 The incumbent pays Be, according to the second-price rule, so that
its net payoﬀ is
Bi − Be = κ.
Hence, as long as the entry costs are positive, the incumbent wins the auction and
collects a payoﬀ equal to the entry costs.
8This assumption is realistic. The requirements for companies entering a franchise bidding include
the provision of records about their experience in rail transport operations. By observing qe, the
Regulator is aware that the company is able to provide that speciﬁc level of service quality, and that
the necessary expertise is available.
9If κ = 0, the incumbent and one potential entrant have both 50% probability of winning. However,
since the winner payoﬀ is zero in this case, the anticipated payoﬀ from the auction is zero for any
entrant and for the incumbent.
73.2 First Period TOC’s Choice of Service Quality
At the beginning of the ﬁrst period, after the Regulator has calibrated all its regulatory
tools, the TOC selects the service quality it would oﬀer in the ﬁrst and the second
period. The TOC faces a trade-oﬀ between:
1. Maximising the proﬁt ﬂow in the ﬁrst period, but facing an auction in the second
period;
2. Complying with the quality standard set by the Regulator, at the cost of over-
investing in quality (relatively to the quality level that maximises its ﬁrst period
proﬁts).
This trade-oﬀ applies provided that the quality control eﬀectively constraints the TOC’s
inter-temporal optimisation problem. As shown in the following lemma, this is not the
case when qm < qM.
Lemma 1. If qm < qM, the optimal choice for the TOC is q = qM.
Proof. The proof is straightforward. If qm < qM, by selecting qM the TOC maximises
the proﬁt ﬂow and complies with the regulatory requirement. The franchise is renewed
in the second period and the two-period proﬁts are maximised.
On the contrary, when qm > qM, the trade-oﬀ is eﬀective and the TOC must choose
between the two alternative strategies of complying and not complying with the regu-
latory requirement. Lemmas 2 and 3 below characterise the optimal quality levels that
the TOC would implement in each strategy.
Lemma 2. If qM < qm, and the TOC decides not to comply with the regulatory standard,
its optimal choice is q = qM.
Proof. As shown before, the TOC anticipates to win the auction for the franchise in
the second period, receiving a payoﬀ equal to k, which is independent of q. Hence, the
optimal level of service quality for the TOC is the one that maximises its ﬁrst period
proﬁts.
Lemma 3. If qM < qm, and the TOC decides to comply with the regulatory standard,
its optimal choice is q = qm.
Proof. If the TOC complies with the quality standard, the franchise is automatically
renewed for the second period. Since qm > qM, the cost of guaranteeing the renewal
represents an over-investment in quality with respect to the proﬁt maximising level of
quality. The TOC will clearly select the minimum quality level that allows compliance,
that is qm.
8The three lemmas above imply:
Proposition 1. For any value of qm ∈ [0,1], the optimal choice of the TOC is either
qm or qM.
The previous analysis shows that, according to the values assumed by the policy
tools and by the parameters, three kinds of equilibrium can arise in the ﬁrst period. We
label them as Uncontested Monopoly, Pre-emption of Entry and Contested Market.
Uncontested Monopoly
The Uncontested Monopoly equilibrium arises when qm ∈ [0,qM] and the TOC selects
qM. In this case, the Regulator can achieve any quality level in the interval [0,qm] by
simply altering the fraction of regulated fares, α, which directly aﬀects qM =
r(1−α)
c .
The present value of the TOC’s proﬁts is therefore given by
ΠUM = (1 + δ)π(qM), (5)
where we allow for time discounting at the rate δ.
Pre-emption of Entry vs. Contested Market
According to Lemmas 2 and 3, when qm ∈ [qM,1], the TOC must choose between qm
(compliance) and qM (no compliance). None of the two options is able to guarantee both
ﬁrst period proﬁt maximisation and franchise renewal. In order to assess the TOC’s
optimal strategy, we compare the present value of the TOC’s proﬁts under the two
alternative strategies. The TOC’s expected proﬁt if it choses q = qm is:
ΠPE = (1 + δ)π(qm), (6)
while the TOC’s expected proﬁt if it choses q = qM is:
ΠCM = π(qM) + δκ, (7)
whereby κ > 0 is the second period expected payoﬀ from the franchise bidding.
Lemma 4. When:
π(qM) > κ, (8)
if qm is suﬃciently low in [qM,1], then the industry equilibrium is a Pre-emption equi-
librium. The TOC complies with the quality standard set by the Regulator by choosing
q = qm.
9When:
π(qm = 1) ≈ 0, (9)
if qm is suﬃciently high in [qM,1], then the industry equilibrium is a Contested Market
equilibrium. The TOC does not comply with the quality standard and selects q = qM.
Proof. In order to prove the ﬁrst part of Lemma 4, we recall that qm > qM. Let qm
converge to qM from the right. Accordingly, π(qm) tends to π(qM). Therefore, the
inequality
π(qM) + δκ < (1 + δ)π(qm) (10)
becomes:
π(qM) + δκ < (1 + δ)π(qM),
which holds true under condition (8). The proof for the second part of Lemma 4 is
straightforward. If π(qm) is suﬃciently low when q tends to 1, then for suﬃciently high
values of qm in the interval [qM,1], it must be:
π(qM) + δκ > (1 + δ)π(qm).
As we formally proof in Appendices 1, 2 and 3, equations (8) and (9) assure that
the range of qm ∈ [0,1] is partitioned into three sub-ranges, each of them corresponding
to a diﬀerent industry equilibrium (Uncontested Monopoly, UM, Pre-emption of Entry,
PE, and Contested Market, CM). The partition is formally described in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2. If conditions (8) and (9) hold, then
i) For qm ∈ [0,qM], where qM =
r(1−α)
c , the industry equilibrium is Uncontested Monopoly
(UM);











the industry equilibrium is Pre-emption of Entry (PE);
iii) For qm ∈ [qM + ∆,1], the industry equilibrium is Contested Market (CM).





t qM t qM + ∆
t
PE UM CM
Figure 1: The partition of the range of the quality standard and the corresponding industry
equilibria.
4 Quality Regulation Eﬀectiveness
In this section we discuss the eﬀectiveness of quality regulation. Building upon Propo-
sition 2, we proof that the eﬀectiveness of the quality regulation is non-monotone in the
minimum quality standard.
Proposition 3. The eﬀectiveness of the service quality control is non-monotone in the
minimum quality requirement.
The proof of Proposition 2 is straightforward. Let us refer to Figure 1. The ﬁgure
illustrates that the range of qm ∈ [0,1] is partitioned in three segments, each of them
corresponding to a diﬀerent type of equilibrium. Starting from zero and moving forward,
the ﬁrst segment, where qm ∈ [0,qM], implies the UM equilibrium: the optimal strategy
for the TOC is q = qM. Moving toward the right, the second segment, where qm ∈
[qM,qM + ∆], corresponds to the PE equilibrium: the optimal strategy for the TOC
is q = qm. Finally, the last segment on the right, where qm ∈ [qM + ∆,1], represents
the CM equilibrium: the optimal strategy for the TOC is again q = qM. Hence, the
compliance with the quality standard set by the Regulator is an optimal strategy for the
TOC only in the intermediate part of the range, corresponding to the PE equilibrium.10
As shown in Lemma 1, in the segment on the left (UM equilibrium), the regulatory
quality standard does not eﬀectively constraint the behaviour of the temporary monop-
olist. That is, the TOC is in the position of re-conﬁrming its franchise just by selecting
the quality standard that maximises its proﬁts. As shown in Lemma 2, in the segment
on the right (CM equilibrium) the TOC prefers going through the auction. The proﬁt
sacriﬁce required to comply with the regulatory standard is high, while the existence of
positive entry costs allows the incumbent to win the auction and reap positive proﬁts
10We note that in some other trivial cases, the range of qm ∈ [0,1] is not partitioned in three segments.
For instance, if qM +∆ = 1, the range of qm ∈ [0,1] is only divided into two segments. More precisely,
the UM equilibrium holds when qm < qM, while the PE equilibrium holds when qm > qM. Moreover,
when ∆ = 0, since α = 1, qM = 0 and κ = R, only the CM equilibrium applies. Finally, we avoid
considering the case of ∆2 < 0, since, according to the expression of ∆, this means that entry costs
must be higher than the monopoly proﬁt. Clearly, this assumption is not interesting for an entry model.
11in the second period.11
5 The Combination of Policy Tools
In this section we focus on the interaction between the policy tools under the control of
the Regulator in pursuing a second-best optimal policy and maximise the social welfare.
Recall that the Regulator takes its decisions about the regulatory policy at the beginning
of the ﬁrst period. The set of policy tools available includes: qm, α, κ, and to a certain
extent, R.
5.1 Ticket Price Regulation
We ﬁrst discuss the consequences on the industry equilibrium exerted by the constraint
(4) on the regulated fare R, for given values of the other regulatory tools. According to
our characterisation of the social welfare function, and to the distributive concern of the
Regulator with regard to consumers, qm is set in order to satisfy condition (4). That is,
the Regulator sets the quality standard above the ratio R
r , so that if the TOC complies,
the consumers surplus will be strictly positive.
We must, therefore, modify Figure 1 with qm varing in the support [R
r ,1] and not
in [0,1] any longer. This is represented in Figure 2. This restriction of the range of qm
aﬀects the ﬁrst period industry equilibrium. When qm ∈ [0,1], three alternative ﬁrst
period industry equilibria may occur (UM, PE, CM). On the contrary, when qm ∈ [R
r ,1],
according to the position of R
r with respect to qM and qM+∆, and assuming that qm > R
r ,
we shall distinguish three scenarios:
Scenario A If R
r ∈ [0,qM], three kinds of equilibria, UM, PE and CM, may occur.
The TOC’s optimal strategy will be compliance if qm ∈ [qM,qM + ∆], and no
compliance otherwise;
Scenario B If R
r ∈ [qM,qM + ∆], only the equilibria PE and CM may occur. The
TOC’s optimal strategy will be compliance if qm ∈ [R
r ,qM +∆], and no compliance
if qm ∈ [qM + ∆,1];
Scenario C If R
r ∈ [qM + ∆,1], only the CM equilibrium may occur, and compliance
is never optimal for the TOC.
11Notice that in the UM equilibrium segment the market is not contestable, whilst in both the PE
and the CM segments the market is contestable.































Figure 2: The outcome of the application of condition (4) to the partition of the range of the
quality standard.
Although the three scenarios may all occur in theory, scenario C is not realistic given
the Regulator’s concern for the consumers surplus. In fact, there is no reason why the
Regulator might want to set R so high that the ratio R
r is greater than both qM and
qM + ∆. If that was the case, according to condition (4), the Regulator would select a
value of qm between R
r and the upper bound 1 (see Figure 2) to assure that the consumer
surplus is strictly positive, and the TOC will always choose not to comply with the
quality regulation. In other words, for any possible value of q satisfying the regulatory
quality standard, the consumer surplus would be negative, while the TOC’s proﬁt would
be positive. Given the Regulator’s relative preference for the consumers surplus over
proﬁts, and the existence of a suﬃciently complete set of regulatory tools to implement
non distortionary transfers, we conclude that scenario C will never be implemented by
the Regulator. Accordingly, from now on we will consider only scenarios A and B.
5.2 The Tools at Work
In this section we focus on how the fraction of regulated fares, α, and the entry costs
left to the entrant, k, aﬀect the regulation of service quality through the minimum
quality standard, qM. Our discussion will concentrate on the inﬂuence of α and κ on
the eﬀectiveness of the quality control. To this end, it is useful to recall that quality
control is eﬀective only in the PE equilibrium.
13Proposition 4. An increase in the subsidy, i.e., a decrease in κ, will improve the
eﬀectiveness of the quality regulation by enlarging the PE equilibrium interval [qM,qM +
∆]. More speciﬁcally, a decrease in κ does not aﬀect qM, while it rises qM + ∆.
Proof. The proof that a decrease of κ doesn’t aﬀect qM is straightforward, given that κ
does not enter qM =
r(1−α)



























By condition (8), this is negative for any value of δ, c and κ. As qM +∆ increases when
κ decreases, the PE segment enlarges, as represented in Figure 2.
Proposition 5. An increase in the fraction of regulated fares negatively aﬀects the
eﬀectiveness of the quality control by reducing the maximum level of service quality that
can be achieved. More speciﬁcally, an increase in α reduces both qM and qM + ∆.







that is negative for any values of r and c. This means that the lower extreme of the PE
segment in Figure 2 shifts left as α increases. We next consider
d
dα







and focus on d∆






(R − rqM), (12)
implying that d
dα∆ is positive if R
r > qM, while it is negative if R
r < qM.
The overall variation of qM +∆, corresponding to an increase in α, is positive if and
only if d
dα∆ is positive, i.e., R
r > qM, and it oﬀsets the negative change in qM. In other






















Rearranging condition (14), we obtain the parametric condition:
R
r




which clearly corresponds to scenario C, that we have already excluded from our analysis.
Concluding, in both scenarios A and B, the possible positive variation of ∆ corre-
sponding to an increase in α does never oﬀset the negative variation of qM. As a result,
an increase in α negatively aﬀects qM + ∆.
The intuition of condition (14) is as follows. Let qM < R
r and, according to condition
(4), qm > R
r , so that qM < qm. More speciﬁcally, assume that qm = qM +∆, so that the
TOC is indiﬀerent between the compliance and the no compliance strategy:12
π(qm) + δπ(qm) = π(qM) + δκ. (15)
Let a marginal increase in α now occur. We want to ﬁnd out how equality (15) turns
into an inequality.
A marginal increase in α, evaluated at qM = qm generates a marginal gain of (1 +
δ)(R−rqm) with the compliance strategy.13 On the contrary, a marginal gain of (R−rqM)
is guaranteed under the no-compliance strategy.14 Given that qm > qM, other things
being equal, a very high value of R could cause the ﬁrst eﬀect to prevail on the second.
However, this would lead to scenario C, discussed above. On the contrary, when R is
not too high, the second eﬀect prevails on the ﬁrst if δ is suﬃciently small. In this case,
the two-period marginal gain associated to the no compliance strategy prevails on the
two-period marginal gain associated to the compliance strategy. The upper bound of
the compliance area, qM +∆, moves toward the left, so that some of the service quality
levels previously achieved via quality control, become feasible through the Contested
Market equilibrium.
12See also Figure 2.
13This is the derivative of the left-hand side of (15) with respect to α evaluated for qM = qm.
14This is the derivative of the right-hand side of (15) with respect to α evaluated for qM = qm.
15More speciﬁcally, when the Regulator increases α, a redistribution of the weight from
the unregulated to the regulated portion of the revenues occurs. In the ﬁrst period the
TOC’s proﬁts increase under both strategies of compliance (q = qm) and no compliance
(q = qM). However, in the case of compliance, the increase in revenue associated to an
increase in α is lower. In the second period, on the contrary, the revenue is not aﬀected
by a change in α under the compliance strategy: the TOC gains once again the same
increase in revenue (which is however discounted by the factor δ < 1).
Hence, an increase in α aﬀects the comparison between the two strategies as follows:
proﬁts increase relatively more in the ﬁrst period under the no compliance strategy,
while they increase relatively more in the second period under compliance. Finally, the
identity (15) turns into an inequality where no compliance becomes the TOC’s preferred
strategy.
To further qualify the statement of Proposition 5, we note from the expression of
qM that if α increases, qM decreases. This means that the quality regulation now is
needed in order to achieve low levels of service quality, previously guaranteed by the
private incentives of the TOC. While this eﬀect is quite intuitive, it is not particularly
interesting because these levels of q can, in any case, materialise. Nevertheless, we proof
in Appendix 4 that an increase in the portion of regulated tickets will decrease more
qM + ∆ than qM, implying that the interval where the quality control is eﬀective, also
shrinks.
6 The Side-Eﬀect of Price Regulation
An immediate corollary of Proposition 4 and Proposition 5 is that the price regulation
and the entry costs subsidy must be used as complementary instruments if the Regulator
wants to mantain the same degree of control of the quality standard.
Corollary 1. Price regulation reduces the controllability of the service quality as a side-
eﬀect, and the subsidisation tool needs to be implemented to oﬀset the loss of controlla-
bility.
While it is intuitive that the necessity of quality regulation increases with the inten-
sity of price regulation, the corollary above states the less immediate result that price
regulation decreases the eﬀectiveness of the mechanism of quality control based on com-
petition for the market and the minimum quality standard. Furthermore, the corollary
indicates that the Regulator may use entry cost subsidisation to contrast the decrease
in the quality control eﬀectiveness due to more price regulation. Finally, the reduction
of the competitive advantage of the incumbent, i.e., the subsidisation of a larger part of
16the entry costs for the entrant, represents the policy tool that the Regulator must use
in order to contrast this negative side-eﬀect of price regulation.
However, the fact that subsidisation is costly for the society (because of distortionary
taxation) generates a second-best trade-oﬀ between price regulation, on the one hand,
and quality regulation and and entry costs subsidisation, on the other hand.
7 Conclusions
We modelled a regulated environment and focused on the relationship between price
and quality regulation for a physical network industry like railways. More precisely, we
considered the eﬀectiveness of the service quality regulation and how this can be aﬀected
by the interplay with other policy tools, namely, the portion of regulated tickets fares,
their price and the entry costs subsidy.
Our ﬁrst original result showed that the eﬀectiveness of the service quality control
is non-monotone with respect to the quality standard set by the Regulator. That is
only by selecting levels of quality standard which fall into the intermediate part of the
support of qm, the Regulator provides suﬃcient incentives to the operating company, the
TOC, to comply with the quality standard. On the contrary, when the quality standard
is too low, the quality control is not eﬀective because the threat that the franchise is
not renewed is not eﬀective, given that the TOC can get the renewal of its franchise
contract by simply maximising its private proﬁts. When the quality standard is too
high the quality control is not eﬀective because the big eﬀort required to comply makes
it more attractive for the TOC to maximise its ﬁrst period proﬁt and face the franchise
bidding in the second period.
Furthermore, we found that price regulation has a negative eﬀect on the control-
lability of the service quality provided by the TOC. Price regulation works against
quality regulation. More precisely, price regulation negatively aﬀects the eﬀectiveness of
competition for the market linked to a minimum quality standard, i.e., the mechanism
selected by the Regulator to implement the quality control. The Regulator can con-
trast this side-eﬀect of price regulation by providing a higher subsidisation to the entry
costs. However, entry costs subsidisation is socially costly (e.g., distortionary taxation),
and this generates a trade-oﬀ between price regulation, on the one hand, and quality
regulation and entry costs subsidisation, on the other hand.
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18Appendix 1
Inequality (10) holds for values of qm ∈ [qM,qM + ∆].
Recalling that qM =
r(1−α)
c from (2), we rearrange (10) into the following second-














































Accordingly, the inequality is satisﬁed in the interval [qM−∆,qM+∆]. Anyway, provided
that ∆ > 0, we note that qm = qM − ∆ lies in [0,qM]. Concluding, in the range of qm
that is relevant to the present analysis, that is [qM,1], inequality (16) holds for values
of qm ∈ [qM,qM + ∆].

Appendix 2
Condition (17) is equivalent to condition (8).
The proof is straightforward. It is suﬃcient to rearrange ∆ by recalling that π(qM) =
αR +
r2(1−α)2











According to (11), there are solutions ∈ R for ∆ if π(qM) > κ, that is condition (8).

19Appendix 3
If conditions (8) and (9) hold, then qM + ∆ < 1.
We prove the Lemma by contradiction. Suppose that π(qM) > κ and qM + ∆ > 1.
Accordingly, since the compliance occurs when qm ∈ [qM,qM + ∆], as it is proved in
Appendix 1, the PE equilibrium segment includes qm = 1. Condition (10) establishes
that the compliance strategy is preferred by the TOC to the non-compliance, when
π(qM) + δκ < (1 + δ)π(qm). Anyway, (10) cannot be satisﬁed in qm = 1, provided that
condition (9) applies. In fact, (9) requires that π(qm = 1) ≈ 0, so that the present value
of the proﬁts associated to the compliance strategy for the TOC also approximates zero.




The compliance area shrinks when α increases.
In order for the compliance area to get larger following an increase in α, it must turn
out that the variation aﬀecting qM is greater than the variation aﬀecting qM + ∆ (both
taken as absolute values). More precisely, the condition that has to be satisﬁed in order















∆| < 0, (18)
and thus results to be impossible.

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